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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, I 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 890509-CA 
v. : 
DARRIN LAMAR PELTON, ; Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of one count of 
unlawful distribution, offering, agreeing, consenting or 
arranging to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(1)(a)(ii) (1990). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989), 
as the appeal is from a district court in a criminal case not 
involving a conviction of a first degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court correctly convicted 
defendant of arranging to distribute a controlled substance. The 
standard of review for a bench trial is the clearly erroneous 
standard set out in State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 
1987). 
2. Whether defendant has preserved for appeal his 
claim that the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) 
are unconstitutional as applied to him. Ordinarily, reviewing 
courts will not entertain issues raised for the first time on 
appeal. State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 581 (Utah 1983), cert. 
denied, Norton v Utah, 466 U.S. 942 (1984), overruled on other 
grounds, State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421 (1986). 
3. Whether the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(1)(a)(ii) are constitutional as applied to defendant. 
Statutory provisions are given a strong presumption of validity, 
In re Criminal Investigation, 7th Dist. Ct., 754 P.2d 633, 640 
(Utah 1988), and reviewing courts give a lower court's statement 
of the legal conclusion no particular deference, but review it 
for correctness, State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116, 1123 (Utah 
1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies is included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of unlawful 
distribution, offering, agreeing, consenting or arranging to 
distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) 
(1990), on February 28, 1989 (Record [hereafter R.] at 4-6). 
The matter proceeded to a trial to the bench on June 
13, 1989, again with Judge Wilkinson presiding (R. at 57 and 
Transcript of trial [hereafter T.Tr.] at 3-4). The court found 
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defendant guilty as charged (R. at 57 and T.Tr. at 46-47). On 
July 21, 1989, the court sentenced defendant to a term of not 
less than one nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison. That sentence was stayed and defendant placed on 
probation for eighteen months with certain conditions (R. at 58-
59). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On February 23, 1989, Agent Albert Acosta of the Utah 
Division of Investigations, Department of Public Safety, worked 
with a confidential informant to set up a purchase of cocaine 
(T.Tr. at 6 and 14-15). The informant contacted Lorraine Coates 
who was to introduce Agent Acosta and the informant to a dealer 
named Paco (T.Tr. at 6). Agent Acosta was told to meet Coates 
and Paco at a gas station at 5300 South Redwood Road in Salt Lake 
County (T.Tr. at 6 and 14-15). 
When Agent Acosta arrived at that location, an 
individual named Chris Baker approached Acosta's vehicle and got 
into the passenger side (T.Tr. at 7 and 16). Baker instructed 
Acosta to drive to 5600 South 900 East, to an apartment in that 
area (T.Tr. at 7). Following the instructions, Agent Acosta 
followed a pickup truck to the Rivendell apartments at that 
address (T.Tr. at 7 and 17). At Baker's direction, Agent Acosta 
parked his vehicle at the apartment complex (T.Tr. at 7 and 17). 
Shortly thereafter, defendant walked up to the agent's 
vehicle and got in the passenger seat (T.Tr. at 8 and 17). After 
introducing himself, defendant told Agent Acosta that they would 
have to drive to a 7-Eleven on 5600 or 5300 South 1300 East 
(T.Tr. at 8 and 18). Defendant told Acosta that they would have 
to make a telephone call at that location and "the man would 
bring the cocaine to that location." (T.Tr. at 8 and 18). 
Defendant remained in Acosta's car and Baker and the informant 
also got in the vehicle to ride to the 7-Eleven (T.Tr. at 8 and 
17-18). At the 7-Eleven, defendant and Baker got out of the 
vehicle and walked to the telephone booths where they approached 
a man who was using the telephone (T.Tr. at 8-9 and 19-20). That 
man was later identified as Paco (T.Tr. at 9). 
After defendant and Baker spoke with Paco, Agent Acosta 
told the informant to call Coates over to Acosta's car (T.Tr. at 
9). Acosta told her that he was "uncomfortable with having 
[defendant] and [Baker] with [him]." (T.Tr. at 9). She told 
Acosta that she understood and called Paco over; Agent Acosta 
also told Paco that he did not want defendant around (T.Tr. at 9-
10). Defendant had no further involvement while the cocaine 
purchase was completed at Paco's direction (T.Tr. at 10-13 and 
20-23). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence produced at trial amply supported the 
trial court's determination that defendant arranged to distribute 
cocaine. Defendant's actions were in furtherance of the drug 
deal and his statements to the undercover agent demonstrated that 
he acted with the requisite knowledge and intent. 
Defendant has waived his right to challenge the 
constitutionality of the arranging statute by his failure to 
challenge the statute at the trial court level. Failure to 
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preserve the issue below precludes challenging the 
constitutionality on appeal. 
Even if this Court reaches the issue of the 
constitutionality of the arranging statute, defendant's argument 
fails on the merits. Defendant does not challenge the facial 
constitutionality of the statute but does challenge its 
constitutionality as applied to him. The actions and statements 
of defendant clearly demonstrate that his actions were not 
innocent. No person of ordinary intelligence could have failed 
to perceive that the arranging statute applied to defendant's 
actions. Defendant directed the undercover agent to the location 
where the agent could meet with the drug dealer who obtained the 
cocaine for the agent. By doing this, defendant aided the 
distribution. He knew what he was doing and that his actions 
were part of the arrangement to distribute the cocaine. The 
trial court did not broaden the meaning of the statute by 




THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL IS SUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S CONVICTION OF 
DEFENDANT FOR ARRANGING THE DISTRIBUTION OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
Defendant's first claim of error is that the trial 
court committed clear error when it found the evidence sufficient 
to convict defendant of arranging the distribution of a 
controlled substance. 
The standard of review in bench trials has been 
clarified in accordance with Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), 
as applied to criminal cases by virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-
26(g) (1982). The Utah Supreme Court held in State v. Walker, 
743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987), that, in reviewing a sufficiency of 
evidence claim, the appellate court must not set aside the lower 
court's verdict unless it is clearly erroneous. Walker, 743 P.2d 
at 193. See also State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989); 
State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). The clearly 
erroneous standard requires that "if the findings (or the trial 
court's verdict in a criminal case) are against the clear weight 
of the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, the 
findings (or verdict) will be set aside." Walker, 743 P.2d at 
193. However, as this Court has noted, the application of this 
standard to bench trials "does not eliminate the traditional 
deference afforded the fact finder to determine the credibility 
of witnesses." State v. Wright, 744 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) (citing Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a); State v. 
Bagley, 681 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1984) ("it is not our function 
to determine the credibility of conflicting evidence or the 
reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom")); see also State v. 
Watts, 675 P.2d 566 (Utah 1983). 
The legislature, in Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) 
(1990), has declared it 
unlawful for any person to knowingly and 
intentionally: 
_£_ 
(ii) distribute a controlled or 
counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, 
offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled 
or counterfeit substance[.] 
This subsection was amended in 1987 to what it essentially now 
reads. Prior to 1987, distribution of a controlled substance and 
arranging the distribution of a controlled substance were 
separate subsections of the statute and much of the case law on 
arranging focused on that separation. In response to that case 
law, the legislature amended the statute to include distribution 
and arranging in the same subsection; this amendment did not 
change the substance of the statute in respect to the issues 
presented in this appeal. While the pre-1987 cases focused on 
the distinction between distribution and arranging because of 
their being in different subsections, that distinction no longer 
is critical. See State v. Clark, 783 P.2d 68, 69 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). The pre-amendment case law is still instructive, however, 
for defining the crime of arranging to distribute a controlled 
substance. 
Two cases specifically deal with the interpretation of 
this crime. In the first, State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922 (Utah 
1979), Harrison challenged the constitutionality of the arranging 
statute which is the precursor to the present one, claiming that 
it was vague and overly broad. The Utah Supreme Court upheld the 
statute, stating: 
A statute may legitimately proscribe a broad 
spectrum of conduct with a very few words, so 
long as the outer perimeters of such conduct 
are clearly defined. The statute in question 
accomplishes this by specifying that any 
activity leading to or resulting in the 
distribution . . . of a controlled substance 
must be engaged in knowingly or with intent 
that such distribution would, or would be 
likely to, occur. Thus, any witting or 
intentional lending of aid in the 
distribution of drugs, whatever form it 
takes, is proscribed by the act. 
. . . 
[I]n the present situation, the citizen is 
put on notice by the statute that, if he 
intends the distribution . . . of a 
controlled substance, any act in furtherance 
of an arrangement therefor constitutes the 
criminal offense described by the statute. 
601 P.2d at 923-24 (emphasis added). See also State v. Gray, 717 
P.2d 1313, 1320-21 (Utah 1986) (quoting the language from 
Harrison defining arranging). 
In the present case, defendant's actions supported the 
trial court's determination that defendant arranged for the 
distribution of cocaine. There is no argument that cocaine was 
distributed to Agent Acosta by Paco; neither is there any real 
dispute as to defendant's actions in this matter. Defendant's 
claim is that his actions did not rise to the level of arranging 
to distribute a controlled substance. 
Defendant's acts in furtherance of the distribution of 
the cocaine were to direct the narcotics agent to the person who 
would eventually take the buy money, purchase the cocaine, and 
deliver the drug to the agent. Defendant entered Agent Acosta's 
car at a meeting point and directed the agent to another place 
where they would "call somebody and they would bring cocaine to 
us [Acosta and defendant] there." (T.Tr. at 8). Defendant 
traveled with Agent Acosta to the next meeting place, left 
Acosta's vehicle and approached the man who eventually secured 
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the drug (T.Tr. at 8-9). The fact that defendant's involvement 
ceased at that point is attributable to Agent Acosta's request 
that defendant no longer be involved (T.Tr. at 9-10). The fact 
that defendant directed Agent Acosta to the drug dealer and that 
defendant approached the dealer before the dealer contacted 
Acosta support the verdict of the trial court. Defendant's 
actions fall into the language of State v. Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366 
(Utah 1987). In that case, the Supreme Court upheld a conviction 
for distribution of a controlled substances, stating that Fixel 
did not purport to merely find, direct, and 
introduce the officer to another drug dealer. 
. . . 
The facts in the instant cases do not 
support a "classic case" of arranging a drug 
sale. 
744 P.2d at 1370 (emphasis added). Part of a "classic case" of 
arranging a distribution, evidently, would be directing an 
officer to the drug dealer. In the present case, that is exactly 
defendant's activity. 
Defendant's argument in Subpoint C is that there is a 
"but for" test for determining that a person arranged to 
distribute a controlled substance. Under this argument, 
defendant could not be convicted if the distribution would have 
occurred without his participation. There is no case law in Utah 
which supports this proposition. The case law cited in Harrison 
and Gray above is contradictory to defendant's position. Those 
cases state that "any witting or intentional lending of aid in 
the distribution of drugs, whatever form it takes, is proscribed 
by the act." Harrison# 601 P.2d at 923. Nothing requires that a 
person's actions be so integral to the distribution that the 
distribution could not occur without that person's participation. 
Any knowledgable lending of aid, in whatever form, is sufficient 
for conviction. In the present case, defendant directed the 
agent to the dealer, demonstrating knowledge by telling the agent 
that they would make a phone call and someone would bring the 
cocaine. Defendant then approached the dealer who was speaking 
on the telephone. From that, the trier of fact could have 
inferred that defendant was contacting the dealer about Agent 
Acosta's presence. These are acts in furtherance of the 
arrangement to distribute which clearly support defendant's 
conviction. 
Even if a Mbut for" requirement existed, defendant's 
actions were a necessary part of the arrangement. Had he not 
directed Agent Acosta to the location where Paco was waiting, the 
deal would not have occurred. That someone else might have given 
the directions or another arrangement might have been made begs 
the issue. The evidence is that defendant gave the directions, 
directions which directly led to the connection between Agent 
Acosta and the dealer. The completion of the arrangement to 
distribute cocaine occurred because defendant facilitated it. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT HAS WAIVED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHALLENGE TO THE ARRANGING STATUTE BY FAILING 
TO RAISE THE ISSUE BELOW. 
Defendant next challenges the arranging statute as 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad as applied to him. The 
predecessor statute was held to be constitutional on its face in 
State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922 (Utah 1979). 
-in-
By his failure to raise the constitutionality issue 
below# defendant has waived his right to appeal that issue. 
It is a fundamental principle of appellate 
review that matters not raised at the trial 
level cannot be raised for the first time on 
appeal. See, e.g., State v. John, 770 P.2d 
994, 995 (Utah 1989). 
Moreover, this principle applies equally 
to constitutional challenges not presented 
below, but raised subsequently on appeal. 
Although reviewing courts will, in the 
exceptional or extraordinary case, overlook a 
party's failure to raise constitutional 
challenges in the proceedings below, 
[defendant] has not persuaded us of the 
existence of such exceptional circumstances 
in this case. 
In re M.S., 781 P.2d 1289, 1291 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). See also 
State v. Anderson, 129 Utah Adv. Rep. 15, 16 (Utah March 6, 
1990). The record in the present cases is devoid of any claim 
below that the arranging statute was unconstitutionally applied 
to defendant. Neither has defendant advanced any basis for this 
Court to overlook his failure to preserve the issue. 
Consequently, he is precluded from now raising the matter. 
POINT III 
EVEN IF DEFENDANT HAD PROPERLY PRESERVED THE 
ISSUE, THE ARRANGING STATUTE WAS NOT 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY APPLIED TO HIM. 
If this Court decides to address the issue of the 
constitutionality of the arranging statute despite defendant's 
waiver, the argument fails on the merits. The standard of 
reviewing the constitutionality of a statute or rule is given in 
In re Criminal Investigation, 7th Dist. Ct.# 754 P.2d 633 (Utah 
1988), as: 
legislative enactments are endowed with a 
strong presumption of validity and will not 
be declared unconstitutional unless there is 
no reasonable basis upon which they can be 
construed as conforming to constitutional 
requirements. 
754 P.2d at 640. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed a vagueness challenge 
to a statute in State v. Pilcher, 636 P.2d 470 (Utah 1981), in 
which it said: 
A statute is not unconstitutionally vague 
if it is sufficiently explicit to inform the 
ordinary reader what conduct is prohibited. . 
. . The statute need only be as definite and 
certain as the subject matter permits. 
636 P.2d at 471 (citations omitted). Using this standard for 
determining the facial constitutionality of the arranging 
statute, the Utah Supreme Court has already determined in 
Harrison that the statute is as specific as the subject matter 
permits. 
Defendant appears to be arguing that he was not given 
sufficient notice by that statute that his activities fell within 
the proscription of the statute. A similar argument was raised 
by the petitioners in Bouie v. City of Columbia/ 378 U.S. 347 
(1964)/ in which the standard was set out ass 
"The constitutional requirement of 
definiteness is violated by a criminal 
statute that fails to give a person of 
ordinary intelligence fair notice that his 
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the 
statute. The underlying principle is that no 
man shall be held criminally responsible for 
conduct which he could not reasonably 
understand to be proscribed." 
378 U.S. at 351 (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612/ 
617 (1954)). In Bouie/ the United States Supreme Court reversed 
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the petitioners' convictions because, although the statute was 
facially narrow and precise, its application was unexpectedly and 
retroactively broadened by the state courts to include the 
actions of the petitioners. 
As noted above, the Utah Supreme Court has defined, in 
Harrison and Gray, the meaning of arranging to distribute a 
controlled substance. The definition given is a common sense one 
which comports with the general definition of the term "to 
arrange." The statute gives "a person of ordinary intelligence 
fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden." 
Harriss, 347 U.S. at 617. The trial court did not 
unconstitutionally broaden the meaning of the statute when it 
determined that defendant's actions fell within the meaning of 
the statute. Defendant told Agent Acosta where to drive in order 
to call the drug dealer and have the dealer bring the cocaine to 
them at that location. A person of ordinary intelligence has 
fair notice that directing an individual to a meeting with a drug 
dealer, with knowledge that the meeting would result in the 
distribution of cocaine, is an act which assists in the 
arrangement to distribute the drug. Defendant's actions were not 
innocuous such that he would not be expected to know that the 
actions would lead to a drug deal. His actions and statements to 
the narcotics agent were accomplished with the intent to further 
the distribution. They were not innocent actions and statements 
which were unconstitutionally brought within the proscription of 
the arranging statute. 
1 -3^ 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this / V day of May, 1990. 
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